Simon Cordes
I am a PhD candidate at the University of Bonn.
My research focuses on Labor, Behavioral, and Personnel Economics.
I study how firms set wages and amenities in the labor market.
Methodologically, I delevop surveys with firms and workers, often linked to administrative records.
I am on the 2026-2027 job market.
E-Mail: simon.cordes@uni-bonn.de
CV: here
I am co-founder and co-organizer of the annual PhD Workshop in Labor and Behavioral Economics.
Job Market Paper
Do Firms Know What Workers Want? | with Max Müller
Abstract: Labor supply depends on wages and amenities, and standard models implicitly assume that firms hold accurate beliefs about workers’ amenity valuations. In a survey with firms and workers in Germany linked to administrative data, we measure workers’ valuations of five different amenities and firms’ beliefs about workers’ valuations. We find that firms systematically underestimate workers’ valuations of all five amenities. These misperceptions are driven by interpersonal projection: managers project their own preferences—they value amenities less—onto workers. Through the lens of a simple model of imperfect competition, we show that firm misperceptions result in (i) labor shortages and (ii) excess labor costs for biased firms. Empirical tests confirm these predictions: a simple calibration suggests that non-providing firms could reduce their labor costs by 5% by providing amenities.
Presentations (selected): SITE - Psychology and Economics 2026 (Stanford); Remote Work Conference 2025 (Stanford)
Recipient of the YEP Doctoral Paper Award 2026
Research
Uncertainty About Amenities and Job Search | with Antonia Bleser and Max Müller
Abstract: Workers value amenities but may lack full information about them before accepting a job. Using surveys of 6,700 German workers linked to job postings and employer reviews, we show that workers enter jobs informed about only half of the working conditions they will experience. We embed this friction in a job-search model with uncertainty about amenities, in which greater uncertainty depresses search, weakens sorting, and produces downward job-to-job transitions. Consistent with the model, sorting on amenities is about 31 percent weaker where information is one standard deviation worse. Because women place greater value on the hardest-to-observe amenities, they are more exposed to uncertainty and experience more adverse labor market consequences. Information frictions about non-wage amenities thus lower match quality and can exacerbate gender inequality.
What Do Firms Know About Market Wages? | with Gökay Demir, Nathan Lazarus and Max Müller
Abstract: We study firms' beliefs about the wage distribution using a large-scale survey of managers in Germany linked to administrative data. 80% of managers believe their firm pays at least the median wage. Comparing beliefs to administrative wage data, we document pervasive and asymmetric misperceptions: most managers overestimate their firm's relative wage and underestimate their workers' outside options. The most-biased managers are also the most confident in their beliefs, and providing information about wages does not shift managerial beliefs. Beliefs are related to firm outcomes: biased firms have higher separation rates, slower employment growth, and recruit lower-ability workers. Embedding these findings in a general equilibrium search model, we show that systematic overestimation can lower aggregate wages and worsen the allocation of workers to firms, and derive conditions under which all workers are harmed.
The Genetic Lottery and Fairness Preferences | with Teodora Boneva
Abstract: We conduct large-scale incentivized experiments in the United States and Norway to provide causal evidence on how the acceptance of inequality varies with the source of the inequality. In both countries, we document a strong aversion to inequality determined by the genetic lottery. Intelligence-based inequality is perceived as closer to merit-based inequality in the United States, whereas in Norway it is perceived as closer to inequality arising from genetic differences. Making genetic advantages explicit reduces acceptance of intelligence-based inequality in both countries, but does not fully eliminate the perceived distinction between intelligence-based and genetic inequality. Greater acceptance of intelligence-based inequality is associated with lower support for redistributive policies.